Often people reason as follows:
(1) If claim C is true, X is the case.
(2) I find X difficult, inconvenient, repulsive, or undesirable in some other way.
(3) (So) claim C is false.
Of course, this isn’t a valid argument. It’s missing a premise:
(4) If I find X difficult, inconvenient, repulsive, or undesirable in some other way, X is not the case.
Premise (4) is deeply flawed. A person can’t properly determine whether many things are the case simply by her emotive responses to them; there are many truths that she’ll find difficult, inconvenient, repulsive, or undesirable, and many falsehoods that she’ll find easy, convenient, compelling, or desirable.
Let’s look at a couple of examples.
First example: let C = “Christianity is true” and X = “I ought to love my enemies.” I don’t find it easy or convenient to love those who oppose me or stand against what I find deeply important. But that’s irrelevant to whether I ought to love my enemies: if Christianity is true, I have a moral duty to serve Jesus as king, and he’s commanded me to love those who frustrate or oppose me.
Second example: let C = “naturalism is true” and X = “my life has no ultimate meaning, value, or purpose.” I don’t find the idea that my life has no ultimate meaning, value, or purpose compelling or desirable. But that’s irrelevant to whether naturalism is true: I can’t properly reject naturalism just because I find its implications depressing or unpleasant.
If someone uses this kind of flawed reasoning in conversation with me, I find it helpful to say, in a gracious and respectful way, “I understand that you don’t like what claim C entails. But we generally can’t decide what is and isn’t the case about reality just by how we feel about its implications. So I think we should get back to discussing C on its own merits—or, if you think you have good reasons to hold that the implications of C are false, let’s discuss them.”
—Thomas Larsen.
Image from Wikimedia Commons.
I see. Thank you, Thomas!
(sorry, it wouldn’t let me reply to your comment directly)
I’m curious — isn’t that what reductio ad absurdum does? Takes an argument to an absurd conclusion to show that the original argument should be rejected? Or is this different?
Hello Clinton! Reductio ad absurdum would involve showing that X is false, e.g.
(1′) If claim C is true, X is the case.
(2′) X is false / nonsensical / etc.
(3′) (So) claim C is false.
But it won’t do to say that, because you find X difficult,
inconvenient, repulsive,
or undesirable, X is false. That’s why I’d emphasise, “If
you think you have good reasons to hold that the
implications of C are false, let’s discuss them”—if there are good
reasons to hold that the implications of C are false, then they may be
good reasons to hold that C itself is false.