I have written two prior treatments of Christian philosophers’ usefulness in apologetics* and here I wish to add another to the list: French philosopher Blaise Pascal (1632-1662). Pascal is widely known for his work in mathematics and science, although his recognition and focus on religion and philosophy wouldn’t come until later in his life. In 1654, where not too long before, physics and mathematics were regarded as secondary in his mind, Pascal experienced a life-changing religious conversion, which led him to a life of devotion and theology as his primary concerns.
Pascal became a close associate of a group of ascetics known as “Jansenists,” named after the Dutch Bishop Jansenius (1585-1638) who wrote a famous treatise on St. Augustine entitled the Augustinus (1640). The influence the group had on Pascal would (in part) lead to his emphasis on the corruption of human sin and the need for divine, irresistible grace. When Pascal died in 1662 of an undiagnosed illness, there was a paper found stitched into his jacket: “The God of Abraham, The God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, not of the philosophers and the scholars.” This demonstrates, in a brief statement (among others), the skepticism Pascal applied to the power of philosophy.
In this post, I wish to show how Pascal’s reaction to the rationalism of his day leads to a philosophically resourceful distinction of faith and reason in the contemporary conversation. This furthermore leads to two subsequent conclusions: (1) Pascal differs from Descartes with regard to his emphasis on the human heart, and (2) Pascal is more Augustinian in his rejection of attempts to reach God in faith apart from love, along with his recognition of belief in God being rational though not able to proven.
The Goal of Pascal’s Pensées
At the time of his death, Pascal left behind a series of remarks, or aphorisms, known as the Pensées (thoughts). This didn’t become published until 1670, and is notably considered to be an apology for the Christian religion. A number of these aphorisms are such as: “The eternal silence of the infinite space terrifies me”; “Had Cleopatra’s nose been shorter, the whole face of the world would have been changed”; “We die alone,” and so on. One of the most famous passages from the Pensées reads:
Man is only a reed, the frailest thing in nature; but he is a thinking reed. To crush him it does not take the whole universe in arms: a breath of wind, a drop of water is enough to kill him. But were the universe to crush him, man would still be nobler than his killer. For he knows that he is dying and that the universe has the better of him. But the universe knows nothing of this (Kenny, 2006: 56)
The strategy of the Pensées, according to Peter Kreeft (1993), is the absolute either/or: happiness or misery, God or no-God. In Pascal’s own words: “First part: Wretchedness of man without God. Second part: Happiness of man with God” (Kreeft 1993: 25). Although scholars have disputed the form it was intended to take (see Kenny 2006: 56), this given theme throughout the Pensées regarding the misery of humanity without God, and happiness promised by the religious life, seems to be one reoccurring significance:
The wretchedness of our condition is made clear by the philosophical debate between sceptics and rationalists. The sceptics are right that we cannot even be certain whether we are awake or asleep; the rationalists are right that there are some natural principles we cannot doubt. But whether these principles are true or not, depends on whether we come from a good God or from an evil demon. And we cannot know, without faith, whether there is a God: nature offers no satisfactory proof that he exists. The best we can do, if we do not accept revelation, is to bet on his existence (Kenny 2006: 56)
What are we to take away from Pascal here? Is he saying that reason cannot tell us whether God exists, and thus, we must take it as a matter of faith? In fact, exactly on the contrary. This is a charge often thrown at Pascal, that his views on reason the “heart” are evidence of his fideism** (see below). Pascal made the famous claim: “The heart has its reasons whereof reason does not know.”
The Pascalian Distinction
What one has to understand is that Pascal is not, prima facie, making a claim about the nature of faith and reason. Rather, “with a France drunk with the wine of Cartesian rationalism increasingly drifting to deism. . . his alleged fideism was intended as an existential shock treatment to his complacent contemporaries” (Geisler 2013: 37). Man is a “thinking reed,” insofar as he is neither totally ignorant or has absolute knowledge. Humanity is corrupted with sin and hence, God is hidden. Therefore, the theistic proofs of Descartes is of no avail here. Furthermore, reason is limited.
Know then, proud man, what a paradox you are to yourself.
Humble yourself, weak reason; be silent, foolish nature. . .
Hear God. (no. 434)
Reason is limited “because of its creaturely nature and only functions properly in the context of Christian faith” (Goheen and Bartholomew 2013: 127). That is, the heart is the absolute “bedrock of all knowledge” (Geisler 2013: 37). This is why it is the “heart which experiences God, and not the reason” (Pascal, no. 278). Furthermore, “this then, is faith: God felt by the heart, not by the reason,” and this “faith is a gift of God; do not believe that we said it was a gift of reasoning” (nos. 278, 279). Pascal recognized something very important here.
Reasoning de jure (“concerning law”), or reason in its nature is great and useful. However, reason de facto (“concerning fact”) is weak existentially and also in exercise, since it is “pushed around by passion, imagination, habit, diversion and random chance” (Kreeft 1993: 96). This is Pascal’s exercise in the Augustinian spirit, whereby he notices the “existential inadequacy” and wretchedness in those things of the natural, such as reason, philosophy, or justice. Furthermore, Pascal in no. 252 makes the observation that “[w]e must… make both parts of us believe: the mind by reasons, which need to be seen only once in a lifetime, and the automaton by habit…”
In other words, we must habituate the automaton to obey what reason has discovered to be true. “Habit is not an honest substitute for reason, but it is an honest and needed servant to reason. If we try to fight against irrationality with reason alone, we will lose. We need cruder weapons…” (Kreeft 1993: 101)
Conclusion
Pascal I believe has valuable psychological (or “beneficial,” a term some philosophers use) tools relevant for apologetics and evangelism. Particularly, the alleged “fideism” of Pascal has a reactionary background that serves as a fresh existential vehicle for the unbelievers “spiritual garage” (heart). He recognizes that Christ is the only true aid to a “happy” and “good” life. In other words, “Christianity only makes men both happy and lovable: the code of the gentlemen does not allow you to be both happy and lovable.”
Furthermore, that Pascal doesn’t think that faith and reason are contradictory. “On the contrary, the mind must be open to proofs, must be confirmed by custom, and offer itself in humbleness to inspiration, which alone can produce a true and saving effect” (no. 245).
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Works Cited:
Bartholomew, Craig, Goheen, Michael. Christian Philosophy: A Systematic and Narrative Introduction. 2013. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.
Geisler, Norman. Christian Apologetics. 2nd edn. 2013. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic.
Kenny, Anthony. A New History of Western Philosophy: The Rise of Modern Philosophy. 2006. vol. 3. New York: NY: Oxford University Press.
Kreeft, Peter. Christianity for Modern Pagans. 1993. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press.
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Notations:
*The Legitimate Use of Thomas Aquinas in Apologetics (2014), and The Legitimate Use of Kierkegaard in Apologetics (2014)
** Fideism is the view that there are no evidential or rational ways to establish Christian theism. Rather, “…truth in religion… rest[s] solely on faith and not on a reasoning process…” (N. Geisler, Christian Apologetics. 2nd edition. 2013. Baker Academic. p. 35)