With respect to holding certain beliefs about things (e.g., the existence of God, the existence of minds other than your own, etc.) we often hold to a criterion of knowledge regarding the grounds for the truth of the belief. Hence, let us ask for example, what might be the justifying grounds for say, believing that God exists? Is there evidence that supports the existence of God? Is there any counter-evidence? If there are equally as many supporting evidences and counter-evidences for belief in God, how do we decide from there? What if there is no evidence at all, for or against?
Philosophers – both theists and atheists – have for quite some time been divided on how to approach this issue. Although I don’t wish to exhaust those views here, I want to pay special attention to a given theory of knowledge fresh within circles found in the philosophy of religion known as Reformed Epistemology. This view (to offer a brief definition), simply says “that belief in God. . . does not require the support of evidence or argument in order for it to be rational” [1]. According to Kelly James Clark, “Reformed Epistemology. . . is eminently defensible” [2]. This view has been held by philosophers such as Alvin Plantinga, William P. Alston, Kelly James Clark, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and many others.
Of course, Reformed Epistemology goes much more deeper than the mere face of it. As we will see through the writings and thought of philosopher Alvin Plantinga, our belief in God may be what is known as “properly basic”, and that is the attention I want to give throughout this post.
Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology
It is important to understand Plantinga’s distinguishing of warranted and justified beliefs before expounding on his religious epistemology. In his Warrant and Proper Function (hereafter, WPF) Plantinga “develops a comprehensive account of the epistemic virtue that when added to true belief yields knowledge – namely, warrant” [3]. This is where Plantinga parts with a given philosophical tradition who defined knowledge either explicitly or implicitly in terms of justification. Thus, warrant and justification became two completely different and distinct epistemic properties. The former, warranted belief, is a property of beliefs whereas the latter is a property for persons.
Thus, the conditions for some given warranted belief p for person S is one that meets the following four conditions:
- p is produced in S by properly functioning cognitive faculties.
- p is formed in an appropriate epistemic environment.
- S’s cognitive faculties are operating according to a design plan reliably aimed at truth.
- S has no defeaters for p.
The discussion regarding warrant and justification was merely here a means to an end; to use James Beilby’s comment, “it provided the epistemological canvas on which to paint his account of religious knowledge” [4]. This account of religious knowledge (or epistemology) is expressed within two models: The A/C Model and the Extended A/C Model. Although the definition of both is rather extensive, I do think something simplified regarding a sufficient understanding is attainable.
The former model is a more general model in application to showing how Christian belief(s) might be warranted, whereas the latter has to deal with our particular epistemic situation (or environment) as Christians. More appropriately stated, the distinctive characteristic of the A/C Model is its “description of the innate tendency for humans to see the hand of God in creation, a tendency that [John] Calvin called the sensus divinitatis” [5].This “innate tendency” is particularly manifest under given circumstances of awe in creation where an individual has a “sense of the divine” through given experiences while say, listening to a symphony, reading a beautiful poem, and so on.
Plantinga’s Critique of Classical Foundationalism
Plantinga’s religious epistemology rests on a critique of what is known as Classical Foundationalism, a view that has been widely held by various philosophers and is not (or doesn’t seem to be) without compelling reason. Since it would appear to be the case that all of our beliefs cannot be based simply off of other beliefs (since the justification for those beliefs would generate an infinite regress of circularity), there must be some given general beliefs that do not need to be justified by other beliefs. Classical Foundationalism has what are known as basic statements, or beliefs. These are called basic because they have no further need to be justified by anything else. Hence foundationalism only considered two given kinds of basic statement:
- (1) Simple and true statements of mathematics (2 and 2 makes 4) and logic (if p then ~p).
- (2) Statements evident to the senses.
Plantinga has gone so far as to critique this view by including belief in God to be a basic statement – or what he more particularly calls a Properly Basic Belief. A properly basic statement in respect to Plantinga’s understanding of [Classical] foundationalism (which he is against) would be something of the following:
- A proposition p is properly basic for a person S if and only if p is self-evident to S, or incorrigible, or evident to the senses.
Two basic arguments from Plantinga are as follows [6]:
- (a) Properly basic beliefs are not necessarily properly basic by the foundationalist definition (1) given above – nor can they be justified by either deductive or inductive inference from properly basic statements.
- (b) Foundationalists are unable to justify (1) in their own terms; i.e., they have not shown that (1) follows from properly basic statements or is probable relative to these.
Plantinga thence provides an alternative to Classical Foundationalism contending that along with other Reformed thinkers (such as the doctrines found within the thought of John Calvin) that no argument or reason(s) for the existence of God are needed in order to justify belief in the existence of God. Rather, the fact that men have the sensus divinitatis provides the sufficient justification needed to consider God as a properly basic belief. As Michael Martin (1991) clarifies, “The circumstances that trigger the natural tendency to believe in God and to believe certain things about God provide the justifying circumstances for belief” [6].
Conclusion
Although I am not a Reformed Epistemology advocate myself, I would only critique this view on the grounds that the whole framework is inadequate and incomplete. For instance, Michael Martin (1991) draws upon what I believe to be an important question in respect to Plantinga’s religious epistemology: “How is one to arrive at the criterion of being properly basic?” [7] Plantinga suggests that the route is “broadly speaking, inductive.” As he writes,
The Christian will of course suppose that belief in God is entirely proper and rational; if he does not accept this belief on the basis of other propositions, he will conclude that it is basic for him and quite properly so. Followers of Russell and Madelyn Murray O’Hare [sic] may disagree; but how is that relevant? Must my criteria, or those of the Christian community, conform to their examples? Surely not. The Christian community is responsible to its set of examples, not to theirs. [8]
Martin criticizes this view on the grounds that (1) Plantinga’s claim that his proposal would not allow just any belief become a basic belief is misleading. In other words, it is true only relative to the view point of Reformed Epistemologists that not just any belief will become a basic belief. Moreover, (2) the rationality of any belief “is absurdly easy to obtain” [9]. That is to say, that some given cherished belief that is held without reason by any group could be considered properly basic – Martin here is thus drawing upon the inconsistency of Plantinga’s criterion of properly basic beliefs as seen in his critiques (1) and (2).
James K. Beilby (2007) draws upon a considerable evaluation of Plantinga’s “broad foundationalism.” In other words, although Plantinga critiques classical foundationalism and is rather well known for it, he is still nonetheless a foundationalist in the broad or modest sense of the term. While Plantinga contends that “belief in God should be based on a single source of warrant. . . [o]ther sources. . . can contribute to the warrant of Christian belief, but they cannot ground or stand in a basing relationship to it” [10]. Here, Beilby disagrees and makes the notable point that
While it could be (and perhaps occasionally is) the case that Christian beliefs enjoy a single source of warrant, it is difficult to see how Plantinga might support the claim that multiple sources of warrant are logically and theoretically impossible. [11]
Although these criticisms and more can be considered, I think some questions in respect to the overall coherence of the epistemological model as a whole can be brought into the conversation – regardless where you stand in respect to Plantinga’s position.
___________________________
Notes:
- [1] Kelly James Clark, “Without Evidence or Argument” (1998) quoted from Reason and Responsibility, ed. Joel Feinberg and Russ Schafer-Landau (Thomson and Wadsworth: 2005) p. 111
- [2] Ibid.
- [3] James K. Beilby, “Plantinga’s Model of Warranted Christian Belief” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. Deane-Peter Baker (Cambridge University Press: 2007) p. 127
- [4] Ibid.
- [5] Ibid., p. 129
- [6] See Michael Martin, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Temple University Press: 1990) p. 268
- [7] Michael Martin, The Case Against Christianity (Temple University Press: 1991) pp. 28-29
- [7] Ibid., p. 29
- [8] Alvin Plantinga, “Religious Belief Without Evidence” in Philosophy of Religion, ed. Pojman, p. 468
- [9] Michael Martin (1990), p. 272
- [10] James Beilby (2007), p. 148
- [11] Ibid.
Possible typing error: Shouldn’t “(if p then ~p)” above be “(if p then ~~p)”?
?^ (if p then ~~p)
I sense this is making God small – as the poet R S Thomas puts it …
“You have made God small,
setting him astride
a pipette or a retort
studying the bubbles
absorbed in an experiment
that will come to nothing.”
God is far from small, insignificant, basic. The night sky teaches us that.
Hello Steven.
I believe that in the absence of evidence for and against God, agnosticism should be our position and reject the universal use of Ockham’s razor as unsound:
http://lotharlorraine.wordpress.com/2013/08/04/deconstructing-the-popular-use-of-occams-razor/
But I believe it makes no sense to say that belief in God is properly basic. It is pretty arbitrary. Why could we not say that belief in pantheism, atheism, deism are properly basic too?
I’m still trying to wrap my mind around what is meant by ‘properly basic’ ???
It means that you cannot justify this belief without begging the question. I believe that you cannot know you are most likely not a brain in a vat without smuggling assumptions about objective reality within your reasoning.
2013/10/24 Disqus
Plantinga is saying that your belief in God doesn’t require evidence or argument(s) in order to be justified. In other words, belief in God relies on nothing else in order for it to be rational.
What about the assumption of something as true and the consequences proving the truthfulness of the assumption? We do this all the time in math.
Steven C and B Brown – what utterly pompous responses.
This post was meant to be an academic article teasing out subtle philosophical points and differences. I would think that should be applauded and encouraged as the best way to get us closer to truth.
That said, rereading my post, I can surely see that I came on too strong and yes, I would have been offended as well. My apologies for that.
B Brown. The apology is appreciated. The problem is, and it appears to be a universal issue in this present age, too much/many of the Church talks at people instead of to people.
I have no doubt that the articles and the response have great meaning and relevance, but, and it’s a pretty massive BUT, if you are meeting – or not meeting – an audience that doesn’t understand a word of what you are saying, then what is the point?
Apologetics is as much about understanding as anything else, and if an opinion comes across as little more than a heap of doggerel, then what is the point of it?
Michael, you probably know that there are many blogs now that serve many different audiences. Some are highly academic and arcane, others are geared to folks just getting their feet wet on these topics. Another blog I like is J.Warner Wallaces, “Cold Case Christianity”…..http://coldcasechristianity.com/2013/why-almost-everyone-believes-in-the-miraculous/
William Lane Craig has an interesting (to me) site, and there are many others that just don’t use “a heap of doggerel”, as you say. Perhaps folks can recommend some here.
Thanks for accepting my apology for my not so considerate remarks.
–Bill
Forest, Virginia, USA
May I respectfully suggest you leave your ivory tower and address the average Christian in words that s/he can understand.
If Christian philosophers address the average Christian in words that he or she can understand, there is a great danger that they will understand what Christian philosophy rests on – namely obscure verbiage that doesn’t mean anything.
Theologians’ refusal or inability to justify their irrational worldview is always cloaked in a thin veil of obfuscated, esoteric philosophical jargon. Spend enough time talking to them and it just becomes a bad joke. 😛
I find this to hardly ever be the case with theologians. More the opposite; it tends to be often rather shallow.
However, when it comes to philosophical discussion in any area, it tends to be abstruse to folks who have not spent a lot of time reading and thinking deeply about the topic. There are many topics that I cannot follow at all without a lot of introductory study.
Yes and Lawrence Krauss made perfect sense here trying to explain”nothing”:
Well, let me just say that philosophy and “nothing”—when we talk what nothing is—to go back, it’s something I think it’s important—I want to go back to what I was
going to say before. That nothing—Philosophy has taught us something about “nothing.” What it’s taught us of is the definition of “nothing” is that which philosophy has taught us about “nothing.” Because what we learned to understand, when it comes to nothingness is not what we think in our minds but what the world tells us. This is one kind of nothing. The nothingness in Hawking’s theory is another kind of nothing. And then nothingness in which there’s no laws of nature, they’re random, they occur with different laws everywhere and physics is an environmental accident, is another kind of nothing; another kind of universe without cause, multiverse without cause, without beginning, without end. We don’t know what the right answer is. But we’re willing to look at all the possibilities. But none of them require anything supernatural.
By the way, he actually said this in a debate with Dr. Craig. I guess when you don’t make sense in general, it comes out in the public arena for all to hear.
ROFL, and you say the theologian speaks on obscure verbiage. Nothing means nothing means nothing. Nothing + Nothing = Nothing no matter how hard the atheist tries to make something out of nothing. Such intelligent beings trying to fit their square logic into a round hole. Maybe if the hole was nothing it might work…ROFL.
Michael, there is no end of material out there that speaks to a popular or less educated audience. I find posts like this to be a great way to stretch my mind and expand my ability to think. It’s analogous to how an athlete must undergo some pain if he wants to develop his muscles. These ideas are just going deeper than most of us are used to, and that’s a very crucial thing. What might seem overly subtle or even irrelevant would not appear so at all to someone who has spent some time and hard work to truly understand how relevant this discussion is to how we think and act.
If the blog is over your head, you can either use that as an impetus to learn more, or you can stop reading it.
I’m sorry that I write in the way that I do, since I would most certainly critique my writing for being somewhat tedious at times. But, if I might explain what I did here: I took two other explanations of this topic (James Beilby’s and Michael Martin’s) and essentially filtered in my own words what they were explaining.
However, if you’ve ever read Plantinga’s position for yourself, then I think you would see that I myself didn’t address every single key point as I needed to (and it is unfortunate). However, the essential grasp of what Plantinga was saying is all in the post. That basically: Belief in God is a belief that is not justified by reasons or arguments, but is rather justified by our innate tendency to respond “to the majesty of God” throughout creation (such as hearing a symphony, and etc.) – of course, more can be added to this. Belief in God is thence what is known as “Properly Basic: (it doesn’t rely on anything else for it to be considered rational. After explaining this, I went on to examine some criticisms (i.e., see Conclusion).
How about this.
Once upon a time a fox saw some grapes high up in a tree. For hours, he leapt and jumped and twisted, but no matter how hard he tried or how high he jumped, he just couldn’t quite reach them. Finally, he walked away and harrumphed, “Bah. Those grapes were probably sour anyway.”
Once upon a time, apologists told a young Christian, “Of course Christianity is reasonable — has lots and lots of good evidence supporting it!” For years, the young Christian tried to find this evidence, evidence that would stand up to objective scrutiny in a public debate. But time and time and time again, the evidence either turned out to be terrible (centuries-late, clearly-legend-soaked accounts of how the disciples died) or outright fraudulent (Paluxy fossils, TV faith healers).
But along came Plantinga, who assured the young Christian by saying, “don’t worry. This whole ‘needing evidence to be a reasonable belief’ thing is probably sour anyway.” Relieved, the youth went on about his day, never again bothered by the complete lack of good evidence for his belief.
What in God’s name has that to do with the discussion?
My apologies, but my that was my smallest size of feeding spoon for this material.
Or perhaps I misinterpreted your comment as a sincere request.
That’s the usual atheist trying to make a point. Since life is purposeless and meaningless, so are their points.