This is Part 2 in a 3 part series on evolutionary theories of cognition. This part discusses Alvin Plantinga’s Argument from Proper Function. Part 1 examined C.S. Lewis’ Argument from Reason and part 3 will cover Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. See Part 1 of this article here.
Alvin Plantinga’s Argument from Proper Function
Alvin Plantinga advances two separate arguments against Naturalism that bear some resemblance to Lewis’. Like Lewis, Plantinga’s argument from proper function begins with a necessary assumption about cognitive abilities. Whereas Lewis assumes the reliability of rationality, Plantinga presupposes a standard of “proper functioning.”
Not all beliefs can be logically proven. Any syllogism must begin with premises. If a skeptic questions the truth of a premise, a new syllogism may be formulated to support it. But the premises of this new syllogism may be similarly challenged, as could those of any subsequent argument, ad infinitum. Eventually, some premise (or premises) must be presupposed in order for logical reasoning to begin.
Not all presuppositions are equal. According to Plantinga, some beliefs have “warrant,” even if they cannot be affirmatively proven. Warranted beliefs can serve as starting presuppositions. A belief B can have warrant for an individual if and only if
(1) the cognitive faculties involved in the production of B are functioning properly… ; (2) your cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which your cognitive faculties are designed; (3) the triple of the design plan governing the production of the belief in question involves, as purpose or function, the production of true beliefs … ; and (4) the design plan is a good one: that is, there is a high statistical or objective probability that a belief produced in accordance with the relevant segment of the design plan in that sort of environment is true.28
Plantinga’s definition of “warrant” assumes that human cognitive faculties have a “proper function.” From this he constructs his argument against naturalism:
(4) If organisms have a proper function, they must have a design plan.
(5) If organisms have a design plan, they must have been designed by a rational being.
(6) Thus, if organisms have a proper function, they must have been designed by a rational being.29
(7) Organisms have a proper function.30
(8) Therefore, organisms must have been designed by a rational being.31
Plantinga demonstrates how this reasoning renders naturalism inconsistent:
(9) Naturalism requires the belief that organisms have a proper function.
(10) A belief in the proper function of organisms logically requires the belief that they were designed by a rational being.32
(11) Naturalism also includes the belief that nothing was designed by a rational being.
(12) Any worldview that is logically required to hold contradictory beliefs should be rejected.
(13) Naturalism is logically required to hold contradictory beliefs.33
(14) Therefore, naturalism should be rejected.
To assert that someone’s mental faculties are not functioning properly is to imply the existence of a standard of “proper function” by which all functions are measured. This is not limited to cognitive abilities. It equally applies to physical organs.
We think a hawk’s heart that beats only twenty-five time a minute is not functioning properly, that AIDS damages the immune system and makes it function poorly, that multiple sclerosis causes the immune system to malfunction in such a way that white blood cells attack the nervous system, and that the purpose or function of the heart is to pump blood, not to make that thumpa-thumpa sound… thinking in these terms is natural and apparently unavoidable for human beings.34
The difficulty arises when people attempt to define the “proper” function of an organism as opposed to an artifact.35 An artifact (such as a clock) is functioning properly when it is functioning as its creator (the clockmaker) intended. From a theistic worldview an organism is similarly functioning properly when it is functioning as its creator (God) intended.36 However, from a naturalistic perspective there is no intelligent “creator” to whom to refer for proper function.
Most “of the disciplines falling under biology, psychology, sociology, economics, and the like … essentially involve the notions of proper function, damage, malfunction, purpose, design plan, and others of that family.”37 So the concept of “proper function” is critical to a naturalist. According to Plantinga, the notion of an organism having a proper function assumes the existence of a design plan. But the existence of a design plan also appears to require a rational being to create the plan.38 Plantinga, like Lewis, concludes that naturalism is inconsistent with its own necessary presuppositions.
Several criticisms have been launched against Plantinga’s argument, all of which commit equivocation, using “function” to mean one thing when applied to artifacts but something else entirely when referring to organisms. Only theism provides a consistent definition.
For example, John L. Pollack proposes that (when applied to an organism) proper function is the way something “normally works;” i.e., the statistically most probable manner for it to function.39 However, merely acting contrary to the majority does not make a function improper.
The vast majority of sperm don’t manage to fertilize an egg; the lucky few that do can’t properly be accused of failure to function properly, on the grounds that they do things not done by their colleagues. Most baby turtles never reach adulthood; those that do are not on that account dysfunctional.40
Obviously, statistical predominance cannot define proper function.
John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter suggest that the proper function of a character within an organism is the propensity of that character to instill a survival advantage within an otherwise healthy system.41 If another organ within an interconnected system malfunctions such that the character in question no longer promotes survival, it is still functioning properly because “it would enhance survival if the other organs were performing as they do in healthy individuals.”42
Bigelow and Pargetter’s argument is circular. The proper functioning of any one element of a system is defined in terms of the proper functioning of the remaining elements of the system. However, whether those elements are functioning properly depends on the proper functioning of all other elements, including the original element under consideration.
Bigelow and Pargetter also “overlook systems or organs whose function is damage control or repair (healing, for example) or troubleshooting; these systems properly come into play only when there is loss of proper or healthful function elsewhere.”43 The “natural habitat” for these systems would be when they are surrounded by unhealthy organs.
(continued in Part 3)
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28. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 194. Warrant is not the same as justification (in the sense of epistemic duty; a duty to ensure your beliefs are true). Plantinga gives the example of a person with no political experience who develops a brain lesion that (inculpably) leads to the belief that this individual will be the next President of the United States. The belief appears even more obvious than the basics of elementary arithmetic and accordingly, out of duty to act in accordance with truth (or at least what the person sincerely and strongly believes to be the truth), this person behaves as if preparing for the presidency and develops all sorts of subsidiary beliefs about what is going to happen. While these beliefs clearly arise out of a noble allegiance to epistemic duty, they have little if no warrant behind them. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 44.↩
29. From (4) and (5) via the law of syllogism.↩
30. This is the assumption Plantinga contends both naturalists and super-naturalists must share.↩
31. From (6) and (7) via the law of detachment.↩
32. From the argument in (4) through (8).↩
33. From (9), (10) and (11).↩
34. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 196.↩
35. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 195.↩
36. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 197.↩
37. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 197.↩
38. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 198.↩
39. John L. Pollack, “How to Build a Person: The Physical Basis for Mentality,” Philosophical Perspectives 1 (1987): 149-50.↩
40. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 201.↩
41. John Bigelow and Robert Pargetter, “Functions,” The Journal of Philosophy 84, no. 4 (April, 1987): 192.↩
42. Bigelow and Pargetter, “Functions,” 192-93.↩
43. Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function, 207.↩
Thank you for expanding upon your point a bit, Frank. I do not believe that the argument is circular. Plantinga does not “presuppose that for something to have a ‘proper function’ it needs to be designed.” I assume that by “designed” you mean the conscious design of a person. As mentioned in the post, he presents an argument which (in relevant part) is as follows:
(4) If organisms have a proper function, they must have a design plan.
(5) If organisms have a design plan, they must have been designed by a
rational being.
(6) Thus, if organisms have a proper function, they must have been designed
by a rational being.
Now take a look at the first two premises in isolation. (4) in and of itself does not state, as you asserted, “for something to have a ‘proper function’ it needs to be designed.” It said it needs to have a “design plan.” Plantinga defined a “design plan” as “the way the thing in question is ‘supposed’ to work, the way in which it works when it is functioning as it ought to, when there is nothing wrong with it, when it is not damaged or broken or nonfunctional.” Warrant and Proper Function, p. 21. He went on to elaborate, however, “We need not initially take the notions of design plan and way in which a thing is supposed to work to entail conscious design or purpose …; it is perhaps possible that evolution (undirected by God or anyone else) has somehow furnished us with our design plans.” Id. However, he also pointed out that in artifacts at least, the design plan is the result of the conscious design of the artifact’s creator. So there is nothing inherent in the definition of a “design plan” that per se requires a conscious designer.
In the next premise, Plantinga proposes that if an organism has a design plan, then it must be a conscious one. Bear in mind, at least theoretically (or definitionally, if you will) a design plan does not need to be conscious. However, in this new premise Plantinga is proposing that as a matter of practical reality, it must be. Now you can challenge whether or not this premise is true and therefore whether or not the argument is sound. That is precisely what staircaseghost did. However, that does not render it circular. A circular argument would not have any of the attributes I have described here of one premise building upon another in order to reach a conclusion.
As a side note, I would also challenge your statement that “everybody reading this knows that evolution explains what is being represented here as ‘proper function.’” That, I believe, is the entire point of Plantinga’s argument. Assuming macroevolutionary theory to be true (which is what I assume you mean by “evolution”), it may give organisms a “function,” but it cannot provide a “proper” function in the manner in which we understand that term.
Thank you again.
Ken
You’re right, mine wasn’t an argument, just a vent – apologies.
The problem with your argument is that it presupposes the conclusion. The conclusion is that naturalism is not true. But all the way at the beginning you presuppose that for something to have a “proper function” it needs to be designed. Everybody reading this knows that evolution explains what is being represented here as “proper function”. Yes, you need to make certain assumptions in order to even start an argument, but the assumption can’t be critical to the argument.
The rest of the article focuses on the definition of “proper function”, which is why I categorized this as “using semantics to prove a point.” Debating the definition of a word would never prove or disprove naturalism or god. We all know that evolution perfectly explains what we mean by “proper function”, trying to find holes in human definitions just seems like word-play.
Frank:
As Marc indicated, I would be more than happy to address any issues you have if you would please articulate them. If it is not a conversation you are interested in having, then that is fine too. I guess the only response I can give to your vague comments is that I do not believe I have done any of the things you have attributed to me.
Thank you all for your contributions.
Ken
Staircaseghost:
Your arguments are very well articulated. I have a few issues I would like to raise as “food for thought” in response.
First, in regard to your point about the genetic fallacy, please recall that we are talking about issues of warrant here, not the validity of an argument. “Warrant” deals with the necessary presuppositions we must make before the logical reasoning process can even begin. It is at least theoretically possible for a presupposition to be warranted and yet ontologically false. But the nature of reasoning is that we MUST make starting assumptions, or else the “train” will never get moving. The best we can do, since by definition presuppositions cannot be proven, is to hold warranted presuppositions. However, we should never cling to unwarranted presuppositions. The genetic fallacy is irrelevant to issues of warrant. It only speaks to the reasoning process we apply AFTER making our starting assumptions. That is somewhat of a side note, but I think it is an important one in order to ensure that we keep a proper focus on the true issue under discussion.
Second, your main point appears to be (and feel free to correct me if I am wrong) that we should define “proper function” in organisms to mean “more or less good at generating some results we are subjectively interested in.” Preliminarily, please note that your definition still commits the same equivocation as the other naturalistic definitions. I do not believe your definition could properly be applied to describing the “proper function” of artifacts. After all, if something happens to serve some useful purpose, but it is still wholly inadequate for the purpose that was intended by its inventor, I do not believe that inventor, as a general rule, would say that it is functioning properly and move on to the next invention. That, in and of itself, does not mean your point is per se false, but perhaps it means we should not use the same word (i.e., “function”) in regard to organisms and artifacts when we are really discussing two different things. However, I think upon closer reflection, we all will have to come to terms with the reality that in practice we are not speaking of different things, even if linguistically we try to argue that we are. More on that later.
That being said, I also do not believe your definition holds true for proper function within organisms as a simple question should illustrate:
Would you say that a clogged artery is functioning properly when it is contained within an individual who wants to commit suicide?
To that person, the clogged artery may come as excellent news. After all, it poses an easy way to achieve his or her desired goal (i.e., death) and yet has the added benefit of not disqualifying the heirs of life insurance benefits as would a traditional suicide attempt. Does this individual’s “subjective interest” somehow mean that the artery is functioning properly in his or her body? Would a physician be justified in writing up a report following a medical exam stating that this
person is in perfect health? How is it, then, that subjective interests can dictate proper function?
There is no rescue in advocating a more majority consensus-driven notion of proper function either. For almost 2,000 years, physicians believed that blood and other bodily fluids had to be kept in a particular “balance” or else certain diseases would result (hence the practice of “bloodletting”). Therefore, at the time there was a subjective interest in releasing certain amounts of blood in order to maintain that balance. Does that mean that a circulatory system that was not in the “balance” that physicians desired at that time was not functioning properly? If subjective interests dictate proper function, then the answer must be yes. But then why did the practice change? How is it possible, given your definition, that the medical community could ever arrive at the conclusion that their subjective interests were wrong? They appear to assume that there is, in fact, an objective standard of proper function that is true regardless of our subjective interests, and it is their duty to discover it. It is a nagging reality that our understanding of proper function is not dependent upon subjective interests. There is a practical (if obviously not openly acknowledged) acceptance in an objective standard of proper function.
Finally, in regard to your last point, intelligent design explanations for proper function are no more circular than claiming that the proper function of a clock is that it should keep time as the clockmaker intended. Proper function, from a theistic perspective, is defined as functioning in the manner intended by the creator. Not only is this internally consistent with the theistic worldview, but it also has the added bonus of being consistent with how we understand “proper function” in non-biological contexts (unlike the naturalistic equivocal attempts at definition). Proper function is not defined in reference to some other function, as
it is in Bigelow and Pargetter’s definition. The fact that they define function by referencing another function is what makes it circular. Intelligent design is function/intention, not function/function.
Thank you to everyone for your interest in this post. Please allow me to offer some brief responses.
Tildeb:
Based upon the example you gave, you have drawn the conclusion that you have a bruise based upon the evidence of the painful and swelling dark area. Your arrival at that conclusion, though, is no more independent of “right thinking” than any other conclusions based upon evidence. There are plenty of people who through various neurological conditions lack the ability to reason to the conclusion that they possess a bruise even based upon the same evidence you cite, so direct observation does not relieve us of the issues inherent in right thinking.
I’ve pointed out the need of a method of inquiry that links causal effect not with slippery words but adjudicated by reality. Note any neurological condition that impedes ‘right thinking’ does not impede gaining knowledge that links the effect of bruising to the cause of the table. Your method lacks any such independently adjudicated linking method. Your method is not trustworthy and it has not, does not, and cannot produce equivalent practical knowledge to my method that works for everyone everywhere all the time. The conclusions you draw from your method are pseudo-answers… nothing more and nothing less. But it sounds sophisticated enough to give the appearance of knowledge. And that’s my criticism. It has nothing whatsoever to do with relying on direct observation.
Perhaps you could define better what you mean by “my method” and “your method.” You really have not made much of an argument here and you have not defined your terms, so it is difficult to follow your point. The only “method” I see that I am using is reason, the laws of logic, while acknowledging the necessity of presuppositions. That is my “method.” Why do you believe this “method” is inferior (considering it is a methodology everyone applies to their lives each and every day, albeit perhaps without consciously realizing it)? What “method” are you proposing, because based on what you have said, it sounds as if you are proposing direct observation or an experiential method. That, as I demonstrated before, is no guarantee of truth, and certainly does not rescue you from the burden of necessary presuppositions (i.e., the main point of this post). Even conclusions drawn from experience still rely upon certain presuppositions about how the world operates.
“Note any neurological condition that impedes ‘right thinking’ does not impede gaining knowledge that links the effect of bruising to the cause of the table.” I disagree. That is precisely what certain neurological conditions can do. Many people are at high risk of causing themselves personal injury as a result of neurological disorders for exactly that reason; i.e., because they do not recognize that certain causes lead to certain detrimental effects.
Thank you again.
Hi Ken. I thought I was being clear: (R)eason, (and) the laws of logic are insufficient to support claims of causal efficacy because they provide no link. Without this link demonstrable in reality, there is no way to determine if the premises of the logic are an accurate reflection of or correctly describe reality. And this has led metaphysicians to arrive at incorrect conclusions that follow the correct form of logic but skip and hop down the garden path of delusion. A method of inquiry that does not allow reality the role of adjudicator is a guaranteed method to fool one’s self. You continue to be hung up on the idea of observation and experience acting as synonyms to methodological naturalism while incorrectly presenting the idea of presuppositions to show that MN is methodological philosophy. It isn’t. It is a method that demands that we link an effect to a cause by means of an independent mechanism that is knowable and understandable. Without this mechanism, any causal claim can appear logical and reasonable. That’s how we get rain dances. But linking the dancing to causing rain requires more than a logical argument and reasonable premises that asserts a link and this is the key difference between your method and mine. Unless and until you provide a mechanism for any and all claims of Oogity Boogity to cause effect IN this world, you need compelling evidence FROM this world to establish the mechanism by which such effects are caused. Logic is insufficient. Reason is insufficient. Presuppositions are insufficient. An independent mechanism that seems to be true for everyone everywhere all the time is sufficient. And that’s why your cell phone works. It ain’t magic or the invisible efforts of a supernatural tinkerer causing effect although such an argument can be logically and reasonably presented.
The great breakthrough in establishing a reliable and consistent method of accumulating knowledge about reality did not begin until we allowed reality – and not our dependent beliefs ABOUT it – to adjudicate causal claims. That’s why Galileo is a giant upon whose shoulders other big brained people have stood. His experimental method showed the world how to approach causal claims even if various explanations were later shown to be wrong. That’s the great strength of the method: it is self correcting. In comparison, methods (such as philosophy and religion) that do not allow reality to arbitrate claims made about it in these areas do not produce knowledge about the world. Arguing that this method is somehow insufficient fails utterly to look at the explosion of knowledge it has produced and the torrent of applications, therapies, and technologies that have accompanied it.
Sure, logic and reason are important elements in creating knowledge. But they are also key elements in how we fool ourselves. MN works better than any other method yet devised to allow us a means to test our explanations not by dogma, not by axioms, not by form, but by reality. Calling this method ‘naturalism’ and weaving a tale of semantics to try to undo it is like yelling at gravity to stop your fall; it may make you feel better and perhaps empower a sense of control and purpose over nature’s indifference to you, but it causes no discernible and independent effect in reality. The fault of this misunderstanding is not properly attributed to gravity any more than your semantic complaints about ‘naturalism’ alters for one microsecond why and how MN works to provide us with key insights into reality arbitrated by reality.
Tildeb,
Thank you for your further explanation. There are some points in which we agree, but even those tend to illustrate the problems with your stance.
“Without this link demonstrable in reality, there is no way to determine if the premises of the logic are an accurate reflection of or correctly describe reality.” I agree and I have never said otherwise. All you have described here is the difference between the validity and the soundness of an argument. An argument is valid if the conclusion properly follows from the premises, without regard to whether the premises are true. However, to be sound the premises also must actually be true. Generally, philosophers do not disagree that input from reality is used to evaluate claims. One common test of truth, for example (by which premises would be measured) is the “correspondence theory of truth” in which “truth” is defined as “that which corresponds to reality.” So I am not sure you have really accomplished anything toward furthering your point here. This is not controversial, nor (as I will explain below) does it in any way address the points raised by Plantinga.
But here is the problem this raises for your position. When describing the necessity for a demonstrable link, you use the term “reality” (i.e., “without this link demonstrable in reality”), but later you shift to “methodological naturalism.” You claim MN is not a “philosophy,” but rather “a method.” That may explain the term “methodological,” but what exactly does the term “naturalism” mean in “methodological naturalism?” There is no escaping the fact that “naturalism,” by definition, is a philosophy. It is a philosophy that is determining your method.
This can be illustrated by a simple question: What if “reality” (i.e., the very item you are attempting to explain via your “demonstrable link”) is NOT limited to naturalistic phenomenon? How then would a method that predetermines a naturalistic perspective aid you in describing “reality?” It can’t. You’ve closed that door from the outset. You have decided that those possibilities will not be explored. That is the very definition of a philosophical presupposition. If “reality” is not limited to naturalistic phenomenon, your “method” of methodological naturalism will never be able to provide the demonstrable link you demand, yet it will also continue to lead you to “skip and hop down the garden path of delusion.” You will never know reality because you have established a method that cannot properly evaluate all aspects of it.
You go on to say “Logic is insufficient. Reason is insufficient. Presuppositions are insufficient.” Here we also agree. But again, you have not really illustrated anything controversial. All you have done is pointed out the difference between necessary versus sufficient conditions. Despite what Immanual Kant may say, reason alone is not SUFFICIENT to describe reality. As I illustrated above, the laws of logic may tell you whether an argument is valid, but without some theory of truth that allows truth to correspond to reality, the laws of logic alone cannot tell you whether an argument is sound. But the mere fact that logic alone is INSUFFICIENT to describe reality does not mean it is not NECESSARY to describe reality.
I could very easily reverse your comments upon your own argument. Data that is collected from the natural world is ALSO insufficient, in and of itself, to describe reality. This too is simple to demonstrate. Let me give you an example: Hubble collected data that demonstrated that the light reaching us from some galaxies tended more toward the red spectrums than the light from other galaxies. OK. So what? You can’t use reason. You can’t use the laws of logic. Explain to me the significance of that finding without using your powers of reason or the laws of logic. After all, you have said they are insufficient for describing reality. The exact same objection you raise against logic, reason and presuppositions applies equally to your data from the natural world. It too is insufficient. But that does not mean it is not necessary. Similarly, logic, reason and presuppositions may be insufficient, but that does not mean they are not necessary.
You misunderstand the purpose of philosophy. Philosophy does not claim to provide all the answers of reality. It provides the foundation for how we view reality. It gives us the means to take all that data and apply it in an internally consistent manner. If your philosophy is self-contradictory, you never get to the stage of evaluating the data because you have already veered off track before you even get to that step. Logic, reason and presuppositions form the foundation that you then build upon with your data. That is the point Plantinga is making. The foundation of naturalism is flawed. Therefore it cannot be trusted to give us a reliable interpretation of the data gathered from reality. Logic, reason and presuppositions all provide the foundation, before we ever reach data. Trying to evaluate the latter without the former is like trying to construct the second story of a building without first installing the ground floor. It is a venture destined for failure.
Your argument is self-defeating in that you are using reasoned and logical arguments to persuade others that the use of reasoned and logical argument is insufficient. It is circular in that you adopt a philosophy predisposed to naturalism as the only means to explain “reality,” then use the conclusions you reach using that philosophy to argue that reality is only natural. In the end you are left with an unresolvable conundrum: If reality is not limited to the natural, how would methodological naturalism ever lead you to that conclusion?
Theists, before making an argument, ask yourself these two questions:
1 – “Am I using semantics to prove my point?”
2 – “Am I using an analogy that is not apples-to-apples to prove a point that does not prove itself?”
If so, your argument is an attempt to distort reality. It may sway the naive, but it’s unethical to do so.
Frank, you’ve made some complete arguments in a few other threads, so I know that you’re quite capable of engaging and making a point. This comment doesn’t seem to so much make an argument as it asks open-ended questions and makes a conclusion that claims the author “attempt(s) to distort reality” and is “unethical”.
Again, it’s very clear that you are more than capable of making a case (for which we are grateful). This comment doeasn’t do that. Would you please state your case for Ken?
Note that Plantinga says determining warrant involves not only investigating the causal origins of a belief, but investigating the causal origins of the mechanisms that played a role in the causal origins of belief — but I don’t hear you crying “genetic fallacy!” so it looks like we’ve made some progress on this score since last we talked.
“(5) If organisms have a design plan, they must have been designed by a rational being.”
But we know to a scientific certainty that this is false. We know that there is no in-principle barrier to describing function and design (in the relevant sense) in terms of purely mindless efficient causes.
Any lecture on the subject of evolutionary biology from the man who in this same book brought us the notorious “tiger footrace belief gene” argument needs to be taken with a planet-sized grain of salt. Let’s just all get clear on that from the very start.
Watch the flagrant legerdemain as Plantinga clumsily inserts normative concepts into a descriptive model. Right there in premise #1 he’s already hopelessly off track. Cognitive faculties are reliable when they are functioning sans phrase, no “proper” about it; and they are functioning in the relevant sense when they fulfill their role in using information from the environment to modify our responses to future stimuli.
Like all normative claims, “proper” is purely a function of our subjective interest in the a system. We take note of the fact that mindless efficient causes have produced some system that is more or less good at generating some results we are subjectively interested in, then judge it based on our interests. In this respect, hearts and lungs and cognitive faculties are on all fours with a log fallen across a river forming a natural bridge. We can talk about whether it’s a relatively good bridge or a relatively bad bridge with precisely zero ontological baggage for our causal backstory of how it got to be that way.
But keep your eye on the coin! In #4 he simply palms the normative concept and hides it inside the (apparently unqualified) “design plan”, a purely descriptive notion which evolutionary biology has no problems dealing with when “design” is cashed out in purely mechanistic terms. So that by #5 he has done nothing but tell a shaggy dog story logically equivalent to “if it looks intelligently designed, it is”. Which is empirically, demonstrably false, which should have clued Plantinga in by means of modus tollens that he had gone hopelessly wrong somewhere in the chain.
Does Plantinga seriously think biologists are committed to saying that a foot in the process of evolving into a flipper is “malfunctioning” in some deep normative sense? Oh god, he probably does.
“Bigelow and Pargetter’s argument is circular. The proper functioning of any one element of a system is defined in terms of the proper functioning of the remaining elements of the system. However, whether those elements are functioning properly depends on the proper functioning of all other elements, including the original element under consideration.”
Let’s assume for today’s purposes that this is indeed circular. Then so is any definition in terms of intentional design. Or do intelligently designed systems not also have part-whole relationships of function?
Who cares? Watch with amazement as Plantinga the Prestidigitator hauls himself up to the rafters with his own bootstraps!
Ah. Sophisticated theology at work, where the slippery definitions of words within the sophistry of logical form explains why I don’t really have a bruise after banging my hypothetical knee on what obviously should not be a table edge. See? That painful and swelling dark area cannot exist because I do not exercise right thinking. Phew!
If only there were some way to link ontology with an epistemology independent of my beliefs. Oh wait…