The Moral Argument
I don’t like the traditional version of this argument that argues from the moral law to a moral law-giver:
Traditional Argument from Morality
Premise 1: There is an objective moral law.
Premise 2: Every law implies a law-giver.
Conclusion: Therefore, there is a moral law-giver.
The most important problem with this argument is, if God is not just making stuff up, then he is the goodness described by the moral law, which means he is “that to which the moral law corresponds” or “that which the moral law describes”. So, you could rephrase the argument this way:
Premise 1: There is “that which the moral law describes”.
Premise 2: Every law implies a law-giver.
Conclusion: Therefore, there is a “that which the moral law describes”-giver.
In other words, this argument concludes that God is making himself up.
First, to prevent this argument from saying that God is just making stuff (or himself) up, we need to end up concluding that God commands the law in accordance with his good nature. When he commands, he does not give something new (new to us perhaps, but not new to him)—he gives something that corresponds to his eternally good nature.
Second, to prevent this argument from scaring away the nihilists and logicians, we need to start out referring to our hunger for true goodness, rather than simply assuming the moral law (or “that which the moral law describes”) exists in the first premise—we are supposed to be arguing “to” that conclusion, not assuming it in the premise.
“A man’s physical hunger does not prove that the man will get any bread; he may die of starvation on a raft in the Atlantic. But surely a man’s hunger does prove that he comes of a race which repairs its body by eating and inhabits a world where eatable substances exist. In the same way…my desire for Paradise…is a pretty good indication that such a thing exists.” — C.S. Lewis, The Weight of Glory
The same is true regarding moral hunger. The fact that the Golden Rule is found in every major culture in history is evidence of our universal hunger for true meaning and goodness, which is evidence that there is something in reality that will fulfill our hunger. Even nihilists show this hunger when they refuse to allow constructs to obligate them.
Revised Argument from Morality
Premise 1: We all hunger for true goodness and meaning.
Premise 2: We would not all have this hunger if there were no true goodness or meaning to satisfy our hunger.
Conclusion: Therefore, there exists a being to which true goodness and meaning corresponds.
How this relates to law, in contrast to the “Moral Law-Giver” argument, is that only laws (God-given, or man-given) which correspond to this good being obligate us, as these are the only laws which satisfy our hunger for true goodness and meaning.
I also like this version of the argument much better because it does not tangle obligation up with fear, or the idea that we are merely obligated because “God said so”. He does not say so arbitrarily. His perfect, loving goodness is what ultimately satisfies us, and perfect love casts out fear (1 John 4:18).
This version does not conclude there are moral truths–only that “if” there are, there must also be a God to which they correspond:
Alternative Revised Argument from Morality
(in response to this argument)
P1: Beliefs, in order to be true, must correspond to reality.
P2: Moral beliefs, in order to be true (iow, in order to be moral facts), must correspond to a perfectly moral person.
C: Therefore, if there are true moral beliefs (iow, if there are moral facts), then a perfectly moral person exists to which moral facts are true.
