The debate between William Lane Craig and Stephen Law has sent what amounts to shockwaves through the Christian community. Law’s “Evil God” argument is certainly interesting. These are some thoughts and criticisms about Stephen Law’s Evil God argument.
1. If gratuitous good exists, then Evil God does not exist.
2. Gratuitous good exists.
3. Therefore, Evil God does not exist.
It is important to understand, in the context of the Craig-Law debate, how this argument arose. Law’s original argument is that God does not exist if there is gratuitous evil; since there is gratuitous evil, it follows God does not exist. Craig’s objection is that we simply do not have an epistemic position to warrant that claim. Craig’s objection is not in fact a defeater of the premise that there is gratuitous evil, but rather an undercutter of that premise. This means that it undermines the warrant for saying that there is in fact gratuitous evil. In response, Law offered up, essentially, (1-3) above. His point was that Craig’s objection can be run in a parallel sense. Namely, Evil God could have some overridingly evil reason to permit the good. Law rejects this as unsound reasoning, and thinks others will too. But in that case, we are essentially allowing the many apparent acts of good in the world to count as evidence against an Evil God. Since there appear to be many more acts of good than would be necessary for an all-evil God to permit, we thus can conclude Evil God does not exist. However, we therefore admit, mutatis mutandis, that the argument against God is warranted, and hence the objection fails. Does Law here succeed? I think not.
First, it should be noted this does not actually counter Craig’s objection at all. After all, which part of that overcomes the undercutter that we are not in an epistemic position to be able to judge which acts of evil are in fact gratuitous? It is here Law offers no rebuttal. In fact, his parallel argument may be more one of psychological, rather than epistemological, significance. It seems to me, and to Craig, that no one who does not already agree with Law’s method should agree with this parallel argument. If you think whether or not God’s existence is justified is not done on an inductive survey of goods, you should not be persuaded by this parallel argument (since it relies on the exact same reasoning). It is here I wish Craig had pressed forward, when it became apparent Law did not understand what was being said in its fullest. This failure on Craig’s part is most of what I think contributed to the perception Law had concerning his performance and whether or not he won.
Since the argument was to be parallel, if the methods of arguing are not truly parallel, then the proposed “counterexample” fails in its intended purpose. However, once again, we ought to reiterate that because we have no idea of any of the consequences of certain evils, we cannot say God has absolutely no purpose for them. Law implied this was an unjustified skepticism, but what, exactly, is unjustified about it? Justification is the ability to claim something as true (whereas “warrant” is the cumulative amount of evidence). Does Law think we can justifiably say certain evils fulfill no good? If he does, how does he overcome the cognitive limitations of our points in space and time? How can he know the ultimate consequences serve absolutely no ultimate good? To say Craig’s objection is unjustified is to say there really isn’t a good reason to think we do not know these ultimate consequences. But for that we have been given no argument. Hence, it seems the objection really does stand, and hence it is hasty to assume the second premise of the original argument is true, and thus the argument fails.
Part 2, dealing with a parallel moral argument for Evil God, will come later
 For instance, perhaps it is the case that, psychologically, most sane individuals do not wish there to be an Evil God. Hence, an inductive survey of goods tells them there probably is no Evil God. Whether or not one is in an epistemic position to judge this is exactly Craig’s point, however.